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Cyrus Bina 
 
 
“As soon as the dominant social group [i.e., the hegemon]  
has exhausted its function, the ideological bloc tends to  
crumble away; then ‘spontaneity’ may be replaced by  
‘constraint’ in ever less disguised and indirect forms,  
culminating in outright police [i.e., military] measures…” 
 
Antonio Gramsci  
Prison Notebooks, 1971, pp. 60-61. 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION1
The issue of war and the loss of American hegemony are now more apparent than 
during the second Persian Gulf War (1990-1991).  At the same time, the building of the 
so-called coalition, which was troublesome then, is now unworthy of the name, 
particularly given that neither the region’s friendliest client-states nor the spirited 
“partners” of the exclusive imperialist club of the now defunct Pax Americana have had 
any desire to join the slaughter.  Britain, of course, was an aberration in this and in the 
                                                          
1 The author is Professor of Economics at the University of Minnesota, Morris, USA.  This paper is based 
on his public lectures, on the issues of war, oil, and U.S. foreign policy, given at the Center for Near 
Eastern Studies, UCLA, Los Angeles, California (December 3, 2002); Marygrove College, Detroit, 
Michigan (April 5, 2003); International Law Society, New York Law School, New York (April 9, 2003); and 
the Graduate Faculty, New School University, New York (April 10, 2003). 
previous Persian Gulf War.  The mirror image of all this was the deepening of the 
differences in the United Nation Security Council and the widening of the cleavage within 
the ranks of NATO itself. This, however, was not entirely unexpected in the view of 
lingering contradictions that were evidently simmering in the period between the quiet 
implosion of the Pax Americana and the loud burst of the Soviet Empire. The objective 
conditions of the emerging polity and subjective tendencies of American unilateralism 
did not find mutual congenial ground on the epochal plane of globalization.  The loss of 
American hegemony prompted undisguised belligerence, culminating in outright 
aggression. The war against a weak symbolic enemy seemed inevitable.2
 
 I shall argue throughout this paper that the oil scenario is a popular myth that 
contradicts the very globalization of the oil sector since the 1970s.  First, it ignores the 
analytical periodization of oil history into (1) the era of the cartelization of oil, (2) the 
transitional period of 1950-1972, and (3) the globalization of the entire oil industry since 
the mid-1970s.  Second, it overlooks the regime of “administrative pricing” as opposed to 
pricing according to value theory and objective conditions of the market. Third, it 
neglects the nature of property relations and the formation of differential oil rents, and 
the characteristics of OPEC in the new-fund post-1974 oil production.  Fourth, by 
focusing on OPEC alone, it discounts the pivotal role of the least productive U.S. oilfields 
that are key to the worldwide pricing of oil.  Fifth, it is unaware of the fact that OPEC 
prices are constrained by worldwide competitive spot (oil) prices, and thus OPEC oil 
rents are subject to global competition. Finally, given the above points, it does not grasp 
the fact that the unqualified usages of words, such as “access,” “dependency,” “control,” 
                                                          
2 Saddam Hussein was an ideal enemy and Iraq was an easy target, which lost nearly two-thirds of its 
forces and more than eighty percent of its infrastructure and civil society to the Second Persian Gulf War 
(1990-1991), and if that is not enough, the country was subjected to twelve years of stringent sanctions 
and daily American and British bombings.  See, for instance, “Cakewalk in Iraq,” The Washington Post, 
February 13, 2002, p. A27, in which Kenneth Adelman, a neo-con, describes the invasion of weakened 
Iraq as “cakewalk,” yet, for the purpose of misinformation, he calls Hussein “the number one threat against 
American security and civilization.” That is why the U.S. policy makers, particularly the Wolfowitz-Berle 
group in the Pentagon, engaged in an extensive campaign of puffing up the enemy with the not-yet-found 
weapons of mass destruction in order to justify the invasion of Iraq.  For the post-1991 economic 
conditions of Iraq see Abbas Alnasrawi, Iraq’s Burden: Oil, Sanctions, and Underdevelopment, Westport, 
CT: Greenwood Press, 2002. 
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etc., in the context of a globalized oil industry, is usually the sign of a great poverty of 
analysis.3   
 
In June 1991, in the aftermath of the second Gulf war, I expressed my concerns 
about the consequence of U.S. military intervention and the new posture associated with 
the presence of ‘victorious’ U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf.4  I detected an emerging 
contradiction: “After all, this colossal military power was unleashed against a junior 
partner which was an active participant in U.S. (Persian Gulf) policy for a good number 
of years” (Bina, 1993, p.2).5  Then I conjectured:  
 
While these days it is fairly easy to be dazzled by the shining armor of U.S. 
military capability, I wish to argue that obtaining such a military “victory” is a very 
expensive proposition that has been largely motivated by the United States’ dim 
view of its future role in the New World Order.  It is expensive not so much for its 
direct costs, but for the future repercussions that will be brought to bear on the 
region as a whole.  Beneath this magnificent and unwavering show of force, 
                                                          
3 For the theoretical basis of these and other assertions on the question of oil see Cyrus Bina, The 
Economics of the Oil Crisis, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1985; Cyrus Bina, “Internationalization of the Oil 
Industry: Simple Oil Shocks or Structural Crisis?” Review: A Journal of the Fernand Braudel Center, Vol. 
11, No. 3, 1988; Cyrus Bina, “Some Controversies in the Development of Rent Theory: The Nature of Oil 
Rent, Capital & Class, No. 39, Winter 1989; Cyrus Bina, “Competition, Control and Price Formation in the 
International Energy Industry,” Energy Economics, Vol. 11, No. 3, July 1989; Cyrus Bina, “Global Oil and 
the Transformation of OPEC,” Review of Radical Political Economics, Vol. 21, No. 3, 1989; Cyrus Bina, 
“Limits of OPEC Pricing: OPEC Profits and the Nature of Global Oil Accumulation,” OPEC Review, Vol. 
14, No. 1, Spring 1990; Cyrus Bina, “The Political Economy of Global Oil,” The World & I, December 1990; 
Cyrus Bina, “War Over Access to Cheap Oil, or the Reassertion of U.S. Hegemony?” in G. Bates (ed.) 
Mobilizing Democracy: Changing the U.S. Role in the Middle East, Monroe, Maine: Common Courage 
Press, 1991; Cyrus Bina, “Global Oil and Inviability of Pax Americana,” Economic and Political Weekly, 11 
July 1992; Cyrus Bina, “The Law of Economic Rent and Property: Applied to the Oil Industry,” American 
Journal of Economics and Sociology, Vol. 50, No. 2, April 1992; Cyrus Bina, “Global Oil and the Oil 
Policies of the Islamic Republic,” in C. Bina and H. Zangeneh (eds.) Modern Capitalism and Islamic 
Ideology in Iran, London: Macmillan, 1992; Cyrus Bina, “The Rhetoric of Oil and the Dilemma of War and 
American Hegemony,” Arab Studies Quarterly, Vol. 15, No. 3, Summer 1993; Cyrus Bina, “Oil, Japan, and 
Globalization,” Challenge, Vol. 37, No. 3, May/June 1994; Cyrus Bina, “On Sand Castles and Sand-Castle 
Conjectures: A Rejoinder,” Arab Studies Quarterly, Vol. 17, Nos. 1 & 2, Winter/Spring 1995; Cyrus Bina, 
“World Oil: Who is in Control Now?” URPE Newsletter, Vol. 27, No. 1, Fall 1995.  
4 I have spoken at the Twenty-Third annual meetings of the Association of Arab-American University 
Graduates (AAUG), Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois, June 1991.   
5 Cyrus Bina, “The Rhetoric of Oil and the Dilemma of War and American Hegemony,” Arab Studies 
Quarterly, Vol. 15, No. 3, Summer 1993.   
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therefore, is an intensified and accumulating political weakness of clumsily 
clinging to the status quo (Ibid. 1993, pp. 2-3, emphasis added).   
 
Moreover, I was explicit then as I am now that neither the rhetoric of democracy nor the 
purported “access” to “cheap” oil is the cause of the U.S. intervention in Iraq, the rest of 
the Middle East, and possibly in other parts of the world.  Rather, these unilateral and 
semi-unilateral interventions, particularly since the fall of the Soviet Union, are the latent 
consequence of the implosion of Pax Americana and the epochal loss of American 
global hegemony in the late 1970s (Ibid. p. 3).6  As I pointed out more than a decade 
ago: 
   
In the past [i.e., during the era of Pax Americana], the United States had sufficient 
[epochal] hegemony to maintain the world [according to its historical mission.] 
Now, it is striving to maintain [the nostalgic impression of] that hegemony.  
Hence, we now see the type of military intervention that neither serves American 
interests nor substitutes for political [and economic] weaknesses.  Thus, at this 
historical juncture, attempting hegemonic reassertion through aggression proves 
contradictory and self-limiting, thereby bringing to the open the most critical 
aspects of U.S. participation in [escalating] the present global disorder (Ibid. p. 4).     
 
THE CONTOURS OF HEGEMONY AND MEDIATION 
 The concept of hegemony, both in its national framework and its epochal inter-
national configuration, is indivisible and “organic” in respect to its constituent economic, 
political, and ideological counterparts. And, it is due to the consensual internal dynamics 
and intrinsic ideological power of the whole that there remains minimal application for 
exerting external and antagonistic power projection.  This, in broad measure, reflects 
                                                          
6 The tragic events of September 11, 2001 are but the reflection of outward political and ideological forces, 
and chains of events that have long been accumulating in the American political outposts and were 
waiting to be internalized at some point within the U.S. heartland.  There is hardly any distinction between  
“inside” and “outside” in the dialectical trajectory of the present era of globalization.  See also Immanuel 
Wallerstein, “The Eagle Has Crash Landed,” Foreign Policy, July/August 2002: 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/issue_julyaug_2002/wallerstein.html.  
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Gramsci’s notion of hegemony and its relevance, for instance, to international relations 
during the rise and fall of Pax Americana (1945-1979).  Similarly, the historical and 
institutional reasons for the erosion of such a measure must be carefully considered in 
view of the mediating imperatives and inescapable epochal necessity of a potential 
multi-polar polity in our present era of globalization.  Gramsci, nevertheless, focuses on 
the “organic intellectuals” in modern society and studies their relationship with the “world 
of production” mediated through the complex intricacies of “civil society” and “political 
society” (Gramsci, 1971, p. 12).7  He argues: “The hegemony will be exercised by a part 
of the social group over the entire group, and not by the latter over other forces in order 
to give power to the movement [i.e., to revolutionize the system]” (Ibid. p. 106).  Gramsci 
then goes on to comment on the qualitative distinction of one historical period from 
another via the concept of “passive revolution”:  
 
Studies aimed at capturing the analogies between the period, which followed the 
fall of Napoleon and that, which followed the war of 1914-1918.  The analogies 
are only seen from two viewpoints: territorial division and, the more conspicuous 
and superficial one, of the attempt to give a stable legal organization to 
international relations (Holy Alliance and League of Nations).  However, it would 
seem that the most important characteristic to examine is the one, which has 
been called that of “passive revolution”—a problem whose existence is not 
manifest, since an external parallelism with the France of 1789-1815 is lacking.  
And yet, everybody recognizes that the war of 1914-18 represents an historical 
break, in the same sense that a whole series of questions, which piled up 
individually before 1914, have precisely formed a ‘mound,’ modifying the general 
structure of the previous process…. [This] reflects the fact that a new social force 
has been constituted… (Ibid. p. 106, emphasis added).8   
                                                          
7 Gramsci is also explicit on the “interests” and “compromise” associated with hegemony.  He points out: 
“Undoubtedly the fact of hegemony presupposes that account be taken of the interests and the tendencies 
of the groups over which hegemony to be exercised, and that a certain compromise equilibrium should be 
formed—in other words, that the leading group should make sacrifices of an economic-corporate kind” 
(Gramsci, Selected from the Prison Notebooks, New York: International Publishers, 1971, p. 161).      
8 Here, parallel with Marx’s Preface to The Critique of Political Economy, Gramsci relies on the conditions 
of socioeconomic change and their political manifestation in order to define the concept of “passive 
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In contrast, the pervasive notion of hegemony popularized in the orthodox 
International Relations literature is nothing short of unmediated imposition and more 
often than not constitutes the coercive action of the opposing counterparts in the polity, 
particularly international polity.9  Indeed, the remarkable journalistic replication of such 
an interpretation is so widespread in the media that, regardless of its lack of critical 
justification, it is duly accepted and internalized by the popular culture of today. 
Therefore, it is often painstakingly difficult to get through an intelligent discussion without 
a great deal of digression and considerable shift of focus when, for instance, it comes to 
the hegemonic rise and eventual hegemonic fall of the post-Second World War 
international polity.  The concept of hegemony, so perceived, remains an ad hoc, 
ahistorical, tautological, and externally imposed category that is readily available for 
consumption of the left and the right alike.  Consequently, it is not surprising that the 
primary measure of hegemonic position depends on the scale and scope of external 
force (i.e., economic, political, and/ or military) toward the annihilation of one’s enemy.  
For instance, according to this persistent measure, the U.S. positions in (1) the First 
Persian Gulf War (1980-1988)10 [which was relegated to Saddam Hussein], (2) the 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
revolution,” in which the departure of the old and arrival of the new are concurrent.  (See also Gramsci, 
Ibid. pp. 106-120.)   
9 Therefore, speaking of ‘military hegemony,’ as opposed to ‘political’ or ‘economic hegemony,’ would not 
be theoretically sound; it is rather contradiction in terms.   
10 See, for instance, U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, War in the Persian Gulf: 
The U.S. Takes Sides, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, November 1987; U.S. 
Congress, House Committee on Foreign relations, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Europe and the 
Middle East, United States-Iraq Relations, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, April 26, 
1990; The National Security Archive, “Shaking Hands with Saddam Hussein: The U.S. Tilts Toward Iraq, 
1980-1984,” National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 82, ed. Joyce Battle, February 25, 
2003: http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB82/index.htm.  It is important to point out that the 
failure of Saddam Hussein (and, by proxy, the U.S. government) to accomplish his mission and nip Iran’s 
militant Islamic government in the bud, led to a somewhat broader strategy that was first “theorized” by 
Samuel Huntington, an arch-Zionist and long-time advisor to the Israeli government, in “The Clash of 
Civilizations,” Foreign Affairs, Summer 1993. This, in my opinion, is the preamble to the Wolfowitz-Berle 
project that is now seemingly in the driver seat of “permanent war,” for redrawing the map of the Middle 
East, in the Pentagon.   
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Second Persian Gulf War (1990-1991)11, and (3) the Third Persian Gulf War (2002-
2003)12 are all considered to be hegemonic.   
 
The conception of hegemony, in my view, has four characteristics.  It must be (1) 
organically consensual, (2) internally driven, (3) historically endowed, and (4) 
institutionally mediating.  The focus here is upon the rise and fall of Pax Americana, a 
historically specific inter-state transnational system that rose immediately after the 
Second World War (1945) and fell in the late 1970s.  Although the phrase Pax 
Americana refers to an American-centered Western system, the latter had included 
several dozen countries that were extended across the vast geographical area of five 
continents.  The matter of hegemony and hegemonic structure were the mutual 
characteristic of the system as a whole, and not a separate property of the hegemon.   
 
Thus, U.S. hegemony may not be seen as one-sided but dialectical.13  In other 
words, hegemony thrives through the reflection of the whole, not the exertion of the part. 
To be organic, the (subjective) hegemonic power of a “social group,” “a national entity,” 
etc., presupposes the material objectivity of the whole.  Otherwise, the claim to 
hegemony may erroneously rely on the sum total of the constituent elements, which 
becomes the source of entanglement in the fallacy of composition.  Therefore, in this 
historical period (1945-1979), the United States has been a hegemonic power by the 
virtue of the hegemony of Pax Americana.  Now, if the latter historical system is said to 
have reached the end of its historical period, then speaking of U.S. hegemony, both 
theoretically and empirically, resembles the story of a king that has lost his throne.14  
                                                          
11 See, for instance, Simon Bromley, American Hegemony and World Oil, University Park, PA: the 
Pennsylvania University Press, 1991, and my review of it in Harvard Middle Eastern and Islamic Review, 
Vol. 1, No. 2, 1994, pp. 194-198.    
12 “Today, however, in the absence of any alternative or countervailing power, American hegemony has 
for the first time been able to impose its self-description as a global norm.” In a nutshell, this is Perry 
Anderson’s rather explicit position on the existence of “American hegemony.” See Perry Anderson, 
“Internationalism: A Breviary,” (Editorial), New Left Review, 14, March/April, 2002.   
13 For an implicitly contrary example, for instance, see Perry Anderson, “Force and Consent,” (Editorial), 
New Left Review 17, Sep./Oct. 2002.  One has to be reminded that speaking of hegemony, Gramsci does 
not define “force” in an arbitrary manner.  He is rather keen on the reflectivity of “organic” social relations.   
14 This is where my analysis of globalization reveals the epochal (internal) contradictions of the Pax 
Americana and its demise.  Historically, the transnationalization of social capital, which is more than the 
summation of the transnationalization of individual capitals (in terms of transnational corporations, 
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THE ASCENT OF THE PAX AMERICANA 
 In order to see the concrete manifestation of hegemony in the then ascendant 
Pax Americana,15 one has to focus on the application of the (tripartite) Doctrine of Global 
Containment after the Second World War.  This doctrine embodied (1) the containment 
of the Soviet Union, (2) the containment of democratic/nationalist movements in the 
“Third World,” and (3) the containment, co-option, and molding of the social, political, 
and intellectual atmosphere in the United States.16  The example of the first kind of 
containment is the task of confining the Soviets behind the ideological divide of the iron 
curtain and, then, unilaterally subjecting them to the protracted years of Cold War 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
transnational markets, and transnational financial institutions), played the role of a Trojan horse that 
ultimately led to the implosion of Pax Americana.  This is what Gramsci identified as “passive revolution” 
(Gramsci, 1971, pp. 106-120) that in a dynamic epochal sense has to do with a loss of American 
hegemony.   Contrary to Bryan, it is insufficient to simply argue for the retention of the traditional meaning 
and structure of the state, based on a claim that the role of the latter has always been necessary in the 
accumulation of “international capital.” See Dick Bryan, The Chase Across the Globe, Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press, 1995. For the analysis of postwar economic transformation, and the theoretical 
examination and epochal significance of what I have called, the era of globalization (since the 1970s), see 
Cyrus Bina, “Globalization: The Epochal Imperatives and Developmental Tendencies,” in D. Gupta, ed. 
Political Economy of Globalization, Boston, MA: Gluwer Academic Press, 1997, pp. 41-58; Cyrus Bina, 
“Oil, Japan, and Globalization,” Challenge, Vol. 37, No. 3, May/June 1994, pp. 41-48; Cyrus Bina and 
Behzad Yaghmaian, “Import Substitution and Export Promotion within the Context of the 
Internationalization of Capital,” Review of Radical Political Economics, Vol. 20, Nos. 2 & 3, 1988; Cyrus 
Bina and Behzad Yaghmaian, “Postwar Global Accumulation and the Transnationalization of Capital,” 
Capital & Class, No. 43, 1991; Cyrus Bina and Chuck Davis, “Wage Labor and Global Capital: Global 
Competition and Universalization of the Labor Movement,” in C. Bina et al., eds. Beyond Survival: Wage 
Labor in the Late Twentieth Century, Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1996, pp. 19-47; Cyrus Bina and Chuck 
Davis, “Globalization, Technology, and Skill Formation in Capitalism,” in R. Baiman et al., eds. Political 
Economy and Contemporary Capitalism, Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2000, pp. 193-202; Cyrus Bina, 
“Globalization: Uniqueness and Universal Omnipresence of Capitalism,” Paper presented at Congres 
Marx International III, Universite de Paris X – Nanterre, 26-29 septembre 2001; Cyrus Bina and Chuck 
Davis, “Dynamics of Globalization: Transnational Capital and the International Labor Movement,” in B. 
Berberoglu (ed.) Labor and Capital in the Age of Globalization, New York: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, 2002, pp. 163-178.  For global trade and law of value see Anwar Shaikh, “Foreign Trade and 
the Law of Value,” Part I & II, Science & Society, Vol. 63, No. 3 and Vol. 64, No. 1, Fall 1979 and Spring 
1980, pp. 281-302 and pp. 27-57.   
15 See Ronald Steel, Pax Americana, New York, 1977.   
16 Truman Doctrine started with Greece and then Greece was “universalized” as a policy.  For a quick 
look, see Theodore Draper, “American Hubris,” in M. L. Sifry and C. Cerf, eds. The Gulf War Reader, New 
York: Random House, 1991, pp. 40-56. For further examination see, for instance, Harry S. Truman, 
Memoirs: Years of Decision, Vol. I, New York: Doubleday, 1955; Harry S. Truman, Memoirs: Years of Trial 
and Hope, Vol. II, New York: Doubleday, 1965; George F. Kennan, Memoirs: 1925-1950, Boston: Little, 
Brown and Company, 1967; I. F. Stone, The Truman Era 1945-1952, Boston: Little, brown and company, 
1953.   
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attrition.17  The Cold War was a multidimensional hegemonic phenomenon, spanning 
the economy, polity, and the entire realm of culture and ideology worldwide.   
 
Evidence of the second type of containment is the declaration of an anti-colonial 
policy, on the one hand, and subversion of the democratic national movements in the 
“Third world,” on the other hand.  This doctrine often led to covert campaigns and coup 
d'états mediated through the selection of handpicked regimes—beyond the boundaries 
of advanced capitalist states—whose contradictory material existence and their 
discursive mirror image were nevertheless an embodiment of Pax Americana itself.18  At 
the same time, America’s deliberate attempt at the speedy economic transformation of 
these social formations, for instance, via the introduction and forceful implementation of 
universal land reform programs, etc., led to their hasty inclusion within the sphere of 
transnational capitalist exploitation and transnational markets.19   
  
Finally, the third containment strategy was channeled through U.S. domestic 
thought control and the attempt at expulsion of the independent institutions within “civil 
society,” such as militant labor unions and political and professional institutions of the 
real or imaginary left, in search of a “hegemonic model” of intellectual emulation that 
would carefully distort the epochal relevance of the real political spectrum for a long, 
long time to come.  McCarthyism is only the tip of the iceberg in this regard.  As I pointed 
out in the early 1990s, “America itself has become a prime casualty [of these Doctrines] 
                                                          
17 See Melvyn P. Leffler, “The American Conception of National Security and the Beginning of the Cold 
War, 1945-1948,” American Historical Review, 89, April 1984, pp. 346-381; Walter Lippmann, The Cold 
War, New York: Harper, 1947; D. F. Fleming, The Cold War and Its Origin, 2 vol., New York: Doubleday, 
1961; David Horowitz, The Free World Colossus: A Critiques of American Foreign policy in the Cold War, 
New York: Hill and Wang, 1965.  
18 The 1953 coup d'état against the democratically elected government of M. Mossadegh in Iran (see 
Stephen Kinzer, All the Shah’s Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror, John Wiley 
& Sons, 2003) or the 1954 coup d'état against the democratic government of Arbenz in Guatemala are the 
two prime examples of the American subversion of democracy, early on, during the ascending years of 
Pax Americana.  See also David Green, The Containment of Latin America, Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 
1971.  
19 See Cyrus Bina and Behzad Yaghmaian, “Import Substitution and Export promotion Within the Context 
of the Internationalization of Capital,” Review of Radical Political Economics, Vol. 20, Nos. 2 & 3, 1988; 
Cyrus Bina, “Postwar Global Accumulation and the Transnationalization of Capital,” Capital & Class, No. 
43, Spring 1991, pp. 107-130.     
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that has yet to recover from its prolonged [intellectual] timidity, its chronic insecurity, and 
above all, the injuries sustained to its collective consciousness.”20   
 
From the standpoint of economic hegemony, Pax Americana elevated the U.S. 
dollar to the status of universal currency through the newly devised international 
monetary arrangement, known as Bretton Woods (1945-1971).  This arrangement—
coupled with the Marshall Plan for postwar reconstruction of Europe, and the Agency for 
International Development (AID) for the “Third World”—exponentially increased U.S. 
power during the formative years of Pax Americana.  Institutionally, powerful U.S.-
dominated international entities, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the 
World Bank, came to direct and influence the modus operandi of particular development 
strategies that paved the way for the hegemonic ascent of the system as a whole.  
Indeed, the socioeconomic restructuring of the system was preconditioned upon the 
eventual absorption of nearly two-thirds of the Earth’s inhabitants who originated from 
the previously colonial and/or semi-colonial regions, known metaphorically as the Third 
World.  Such an absorption was, of course, contingent upon what Gramsci called 
“passive revolution,” which, in turn, demanded the need for the separation of immediate 
producer from the land and the creation of an internal market for the propagation of 
transnational capital exploitation.21   
 
By way of digression, this is contrary to the colonial system of Pax Britannica, 
which essentially lived and died by the swords of (1) direct administration of the 
colonies, (2) direct plunder of the natural wealth and economic resources of the 
colonies, (3) direct and unmediated repatriation of surplus from the colonies, (4) 
universal rule of gunboat diplomacy as foreign policy, and (5) “ethics” of physical 
segregation and cultural separation within the empire, with a few mediating institutions 
                                                          
20 Bina, 1993, op. cit., p. 6.  See Murray B. Levin, Political Hysteria in America: The Democratic Capacity 
for Repression, New York: Basic books, 1971; D. Caute, The Great Fear: The Anti-Communist Purge 
Under Truman and Eisenhower, London, 1978.   
21 Adapted, in part, from Bina (1993).  See the sources in note #14 for the significance of the land reform 
programs, import-substitution and export-platform strategies in the 1950s and 1960s.  It goes without 
saying that many of these programs were neither successful nor adequate for the construction of the new 
social formation. And, to the extent that they were successful, their impact was lopsided and uneven vis-à-
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conducive to development of social relations and integral development.  Historically, 
therefore, Pax Britannica had become a defunct system by early in the twentieth 
century.  The death of Pax Britannica, however, removed Britain from its hegemonic 
seat, while the corps of the Empire was long left unburied.  The proper burial of the 
British Empire came much later, perhaps, with the graceful assistance of people like 
Gandhi of India and Mossadegh of Iran.  Therefore, although, both Pax Britannica and 
Pax Americana did produce their own qualitatively distinct “passive revolutions,” they 
nevertheless exhibited similarities in terms of their respective epochal 
accomplishments.22  
 
Now, given the brief characterization of Pax Americana above, the hegemony 
embedded in this system can be measured by its underpinning social relations, on the 
one hand, and the mediating economic, political, and ideological institutions within its 
global reach, on the other hand.  In other words, both necessary and sufficient 
conditions must be satisfied in order to speak of hegemony in any historically specific 
system: (1) the quality of existing social relations and (2) the potential capacity of 
mediating institutions.  In the case of Pax Americana, during the height of its hegemony, 
social relations, combined with international economic institutions, led to the further 
transnationalization of capital.23   
 
At the same time, Pax Americana’s mediating social, political, and ideological 
institutions, in conjunction with its tripartite containment strategies, provided a 
hegemonic network for the international polity and economy, and accordingly articulated 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
vis the transformation of these social formations, within the larger picture of global capital accumulation.  
Yet, in my opinion, these programs were mightily successful for their irreversible destruction of the past.   
22 I argue that the Pax Americana has developed similar, yet qualitatively different, internal contradictions 
vis-à-vis the present era of globalization.  As history has shown, a singular point of departure here is that 
the empires become more belligerent in their descent than in their ascent. A case in point is the 
nationalization of oil in Iran (1951) and the bizarre behavior of the British government, given the nominal 
status of the British Empire.  See, for instance, Mostafa Elm, Oil, Power, and Principle: Iran’s Oil 
Nationalization and Its Aftermath, Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1992.   
23 Here my emphasis is upon the transnationalization of social relations that had led to the sustained 
patchwork of deteriorated “Third World” regions within the “First World,” (i.e., plant closings, etc. in the 
U.S.) in the 1980s and the developed regions within the “Third World” (i.e., NICs).  Subsequently, after the 
fall of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s, the significance of this tripartite category has been lost to 
globalization.    
 11
the long-term ideological objectives of the system.  To be sure, by design, the conduct of 
the post-war coup d’états was far from naked aggression.  They were hidden 
aggressions behind the back of the “Third World” masses rather than being in their face. 
It might be argued that the covert nature of these political and ideological operations is 
indicative of the need to keep them hidden from watchful eyes in the Soviet camp. Yet, 
given the nature, extent, and depth of intelligence gathering and counter-intelligence 
reaction during the Cold War, it would not be reasonable to assume that these covert 
activities, by either side, would have remained hidden from the attention of the other.  
Indeed, the success of these political interventions by the US is evidence of the 
hegemonic capability of the US over the seemingly non-hegemonic Soviet Union. The 
Vietnam War, however, was the watershed, the beginning of the end, i.e., the 
unmistakable commencement of the decline of Pax Americana and U.S. global 
hegemony.  This desperate, anachronous gunboat diplomacy did not work. The result 
was an intensive political crisis that ended with a remarkable defeat, combined with an 
extensive political and economic upheaval, which was then followed by a historic 
international monetary crisis that eventually, in August 1971, buried the Bretton Woods 
system.   
 
HEGEMONIC REVERSAL AND HEGEMONIC NOSTALGIA 
 
 The dominant reason for the implosion of Pax Americana was due to both the 
quantitative and qualitative transformation of global social relations, i.e., in terms of 
Gramsci’s “passive revolution.”24  At a more fundamental level, since the 1970s, it is 
through the particular dialectical relationship of state and the manifold geographical 
integration, disintegration, and re-integration of global capital, that one may speak of the 
demise of the U.S.-dominated hierarchy and thus loss of hegemony.  In political terms, 
such reflections are apparent in European unification and the political and ideological 
upheavals that have taken place in many strategically located (“Third World”) client 
                                                          
24 The claim here is not that the fundamental social relations of capitalism have changed.  But the fact 
that, due to the “passive revolution” toward the global “victory of the mode of production,” in Marx’s sense, 
the postwar hierarchy of the inter-state international system (i.e., Pax Americana) has lost its hegemonic 
significance.  
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states within Pax Americana.  A case in point the so-called U.S. two-pillar foreign policy 
in the Persian Gulf which was lost to the Iranian revolution and become eventually 
redundant in respect to Saudi Arabia.25   
 
I also argue, in passing, that the rise of so-called political Islam, since the late 
1970s, should not be interpreted as an independent competing alternative to liberal 
democracy, despite the rhetoric of Islamic movements and the frightful and exaggerated 
claims of governments and media in the West.  To be sure, as the Iranian experience 
demonstrates, Islam is not a viable “third way.”  I argue that the “rise” of political Islam, 
particularly in several client states within the presently defunct Pax Americana, is the 
mirror image of political failure in the West. Given the collapse of ‘state capitalism’ in the 
former Soviet states and the crises of liberal democracy in the West, neither of these 
models can be seen as viable alternatives in the eyes of Islamists. Nonetheless, the rise 
of political Islam, being itself the unintended consequence of U.S. imperialism itself, for 
good measure, is a reflection of loss of American hegemony.26   
 
Among the ideological characteristics and institutional imperatives of postwar 
U.S. containment doctrines, the containment of the Soviet Union had its own manifold 
objectives; the most important of which was nuclear deterrence and retreat from first 
strike.  The containment of democracy and independence in the Third-World chunk of 
Pax Americana had, nonetheless, recognized some degree of formal, i.e., nominal, 
national and territorial sovereignty.  Finally, postwar containment of people’s thought, 
and their ideological and political behavior in U.S. domestic “civil society,” nonetheless, 
                                                          
25 For instance, challenges from the European side led to the crisis of the Bretton Woods System (1968-
1971).  Challenges from the “Third World” component of Pax Americana, included Iran (1979), Nicaragua 
(1979), etc. These are among the subjective elements of loss of American hegemony due to 
dismemberment or outward resentment of a substantial part of the now-defunct Pax Americana.  
However, for those whose Euro-centric vision has no room for any analysis other than U.S.-Europe 
relations, loss of hegemony is hard to grasp in its entirety.  See, for instance, Perry Anderson, “Force and 
Consent,” 2002, op. cit.  Also, for these writers globalization is simply equivalent to Americanization.  For 
instance, despite the fact that more than eighty-five percent of products are produced beyond the 
boundaries of any one nation-state, Anderson is convinced that “… American firms like American films 
[are] exportable and reproducible across the world” (Ibid. p. 25).         
26 See Cyrus Bina, “Toward a New World Order: U.S. Hegemony, Client States and Islamic Alternative,” in 
H. Mutalib and T. Hashmi, eds. Islam, Muslims and the Modern State, St. Martin’s Press, 1994, pp. 3-30; 
Cyrus Bina, “Farewell to the Pax Americana: Iran, Political Islam, and the Passing of the Old Order,” in H. 
Zangeneh, ed. Islam, Iran, and World Stability, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994, pp. 41-74. 
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has not led to the establishment of a police state (or a garrison state, vis-à-vis the 
world), with arbitrary, preemptive, and systematically totalitarian objectives against its 
own citizens.  In other words, historically, such instruments of hegemonic rule were 
reflective of the outward dynamics of a worldwide structure that constituted the very 
essence of Pax Americana from its splendid inauguration to its paradoxical conclusion.    
 
Now, the examination of the desperate and discursive reversal of these and many 
other mechanisms of U.S. hegemony, particularly since the beginning of the Bush 
administration in January 2001—in the context of epochal continuity and change—
reveals a vivid historical loss of hegemony in terms of the full replacement of 
“spontaneity” and complete resort to belligerent, unilateral, and reckless domestic27 and 
foreign policy.  Hence, methodologically, any analysis of current inter-imperialist rivalries 
must be calibrated against the quality of these epochal shifts.28  In December 2001, the 
Bush administration unveiled its “National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass 
Destruction.”29 This was following its earlier pronouncement of the “Axis of Evil” policy 
against a handful of so-called “rogue” states in the Middle East and elsewhere.  The 
Bush administration used the unfortunate events of September 11, 2001 as a 
convenient cover in order to advance toward its “permanent war” policy.30  This was a 
                                                          
27 See, for instance, Geoffrey Neale, “A Patriot Attack on America,” Counterpunch, April 10, 2003, 
http://www.counterpunch.org/neale04102003.html.  
28 On the notion of inter-imperialist rivalry or what is known popularly as geopolitics, one has to address 
the transformation of the whole (i.e., the entire global relations as a whole), before coming to the 
recognition and thus analysis of the parts and their relations.  The phenomenon of "inter-imperialist 
rivalry," therefore, is tied to the dynamics and historical specificity of a particular era.  For instance, 
analytically, the inter-imperialist rivalry within the Pax Americana must be treated differently from the 
"inter-imperialist" rivalry in the era of globalization and post-Pax Americana. 
29 We have to distinguish between the epochal and the temporal reflections of the Bush administration at 
this turbulent juncture in U.S. history.  Therefore, it would be misleading to attribute these belligerent 
policies and utterances to the Administration’s political preparation for the 2004 campaign against the 
Democrats.  It is particularly noteworthy that, on the issue of the invasion of Iraq, the Democrats have 
remained “non-partisan” and, perhaps, until election time, will remain in the hip pocket of the Republicans.    
30 The Wolfowitz-Perle project of permanent war, particularly for redrawing the map of the Middle East, 
was formulated long before September 11, 2001.  Consequently, the September 11 tragedy was used by 
the neo-conservative cry-wolves to push their agenda beginning with Iraq.  Paul Wolfowitz is 
Undersecretary of Defense and Richard Perle was Chairman of the Pentagon Policy Board before his 
resignation due to a conflict of interest scandal in March 27, 2003.  The Pentagon Policy Board, rather 
than the Secretary of State, is nowadays in charge of U.S. foreign policy.  This Board, which is stacked up 
with hardcore neo-conservative lobbyists include Kenneth Adelman, Richard Allen, Martin Anderson, Gary 
S. Becker (the seemingly harmless author of “Human Capital”), Barry M. Blechman, Harold Brown, Eliot 
Cohen, Devon Cross, Gen. (Ret.) Ronald R. Fogleman, Thomas Foley, Tillie Fowler, Newt Gingrich, 
Gerald Hillman, Gen. (Ret.) Charles A. Horner, Fred C. Ikle, Adm. David Jeremiah, Henry Kissinger, Adm. 
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formal annunciation of the Doctrine of Preemption, a fundamental policy break from the 
Doctrine of Containment, as follows: 
 
An effective strategy for countering WMD [Weapons of Mass Destruction], 
including their use and further proliferation, is an integral component of the 
National Security Strategy of the United States of America.  As with the war on 
terrorism [i.e., invasion of Afghanistan, etc.], our strategy for homeland security, 
and our new concept of deterrence, the U.S. approach to combat WMD 
represents a fundamental change from the past… (p. 1, emphasis added).  
Because deterrence may not succeed, and because of the potentially devastating 
consequences of WMD use against our forces and civilian population, U.S. 
military forces and appropriate civilian agencies must have the capability to 
defend against WMD-armed adversaries, including in appropriate cases through 
preemptive measures.  This requires capabilities to detect and destroy an 
adversary’s WMD assets before these weapons are used (p. 3, emphasis 
added).31
  
As we have seen so far, following the full-scale invasion of Iraq by the American 
and British forces32, no weapons of mass destruction have yet been found.  However, in 
the 1980s, while Saddam Hussein was gassing the Iranian troops and Iraq’s own Kurds, 
the U.S. government, with full knowledge of these activities, showed no apparent 
concern about the use of the weapons of mass destruction.33 The following passages 
are illuminating: 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
(Ret.) William Owens, Dan Quayle, Henry Rowen, James Schlesinger, Gen. (Ret.) Jack Sheehan, Kiron 
Skinner, Walter B. Slocombe, Hal Sonnenfeldt, Ruth Wadgwood, Chris Williams, Pete Wilson, James 
Woolsey, Michele A Flournoy and George P. Shultz.  See:  
http://www.cooperativeresearch.org/organization/profiles/defensepolicyboard.html   
31 White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 17, 2002.  
32 See Mickey Z, “The Coalition of the Unindicted,” Counterpunch, April 18, 2003: 
http://www.counterpunch.org/mickey04182003.html; John McMurtry, “Understanding the U.S. War State,” 
Globalresearch, March 25, 2003: http://www.globalresearch.ca.  
33 National Security Decision Directive (NSDD 99), July 12, 1983, November 21, 1983 memo (“Iraqi Use of 
Chemical Weapons”) sent by Jonathan T. Howe to Lawrence S. Eagleburger, December 10, 1983; cable, 
concerning “Rumsfeld Visit to Iraq,” to the State Department from U.S. Interest Section in Iraq; December 
21, 1983 cable from U.S. Embassy in U.K. to the State Department concerning Rumsfeld meeting with 
Saddam Hussein.  See Joyce Battle (ed.), “Shaking Hands with Saddam Hussein: The U.S. Tilts Toward 
 15
 The U.S., which followed developments in the Iran-Iraq war with extraordinary 
intensity, had intelligence confirming Iran’s accusations, and describing Iraq’s 
“almost daily” use of chemical weapons, concurrent with its policy review and 
decision to support Iraq in the war.  The intelligence indicated that Iraq used 
chemical weapons against Iranian forces, and according to a November 1983 
memo, against “Kurdish insurgents” as well.34
  
 [When] Donald Rumsfeld … was dispatched to the Middle East as a presidential 
envoy … [h]is December 1983 tour of regional capitals included Baghdad, where 
he was to establish “direct contact between an envoy of President Reagan and 
President Saddam Hussein,” while emphasizing “his close relationship” with the 
president.  Rumsfeld met with Saddam, and the two discussed regional issues of 
mutual interest, shared enmity toward Iran and Syria, and the US’s effort to find 
alternative routes to transport Iraq’s oil; its facilities in the Persian Gulf had been 
shot down by Iran, and Iran’s ally, Syria, had cut off a pipeline that transported 
Iraqi oil through the territory. Rumsfeld made no reference to chemical weapons, 
according to detailed notes on the meeting.35   
 
 On the flip side, some twenty years and two Persian Gulf wars later, the U.S. 
government, after intense arm-twisting, disdainful bribery, and frantic illegal wire-tapping 
at the U. N. Security Council, did not manage to get what it asked for.  This time, 
contrary to the Iran-Iraq war interlude, the U.S. insisted that Saddam Hussein must have 
been developing weapons of mass destruction.  This claim, however, was incompatible 
with the various U.N. inspection reports and U.N. team under Dr. Blix and Dr. ElBaradei.  
Dr. Blix also challenged the United States for being unreasonable and, perhaps, 
unserious about the adequacy of time for thorough U.N. inspection.  The heavyweight 
members of the Security Council, aside from the U.S. and U.K, did not want to be 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
Iraq, 1980-1984,”  The National Security Archive, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 
82, February 25, 2003: http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB82/index.htm.  
34 The National Security Archive, Ibid. P. 3, emphasis added.  
35 The National Security Archive, Ibid. pp. 3-4, emphasis added.   
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rushed into a premature conclusion.  They all preferred a peaceful resolution to a war 
option in this case.  It was the United States, which was anxiously looking at its 
preemptive watch—a bloody watch that was set according to the Wolfowitz-Berle 
timetable.  Now, given ample opportunity for inspection in post-war occupied Iraq, no 
weapons of mass destruction have been found.36   
 
Finally, Colin Powell’s U. N. presentation turned out to be a hoax.  It was a 
clumsy blend of outright plagiarism (carbon-copied from three different sources, 
including a decade-old graduate student thesis, portrayed as new intelligence)37 and 
some unsubstantiated claims based on the recorded conversation of “two senior [Iraqi] 
officers”. These two officers were allegedly speaking of “modified vehicles,” “forbidden 
ammo,” and the need for alleged destruction of some kind of message.  In his 
presentation, Powell also named an Iraqi business enterprise, which was allegedly 
“involved in prohibited weapons system activity.”  Finally, in a haphazard manner, Powell 
showed several satellite pictures from the selected sites that allegedly were centers for 
the production of weapons of mass destruction. Powell, who himself clearly realized that 
there is not much evidence on the table, was quick to declare: “I cannot tell you 
                                                          
36 The allegation of “weapons of mass destruction” was the ploy since the U.S. government has not been 
interested in the U. N. inspection process from the very beginning.  One has to remember that, knowing 
well in advance about the flimsiness of this argument, the neo-cons in charge of the new U.S. foreign 
policy invented another deceptive justification for the invasion Iraq.  They invoked the buzzword of 
“democracy” for Iraqi people and let organizations such as the Washington Institute for Near East Policy or 
the American Enterprise Institute, and their Orwellian loud speakers within the corporate-driven, 
browbeaten media to devour the American intelligence.  The clever parlance of the Bush-Sharon Doctrine 
of Preemption so far seems to have worked on the mind of either the doctrinaire or gravely unread.  Yet, 
the intermittent confusion did the trick.   
37 According to BBC, when Powell delivered his melodramatic speech on Wednesday, February 5, 2003, 
at the U. N. Security Council, he subsequently recommended reading a dossier of evidence released by 
British intelligence earlier in the week.  He indicated: “I would call my colleagues’ attention to the fine 
paper that United Kingdom distributed yesterday, which describes in exquisite detail Iraqi deception 
activities.”  Reportedly, the “authors” of British report, copied (including the typos) from Ibrahim al-
Marashi’s article: ‘Iraq’s Security and Intelligence Network: A Guide and Analysis’ in the Middle East 
Review of International Affairs (Vol. 6, No. 3, Sep. 2002) and, according to The Guardian, relied rather 
heavily on a 1997 article by Sean Boyne and Ken Gause in Jane’s Intelligence Review.  It is instructive to 
note that Al-Marashi’s article has nothing to do with current allegation of the existence of WMD in Iraq. Al-
Marathi attempted to examine the Iraqi documents captured in the 1991 liberation of Kuwait and the ones 
obtained from subsequent Kurdish raids in the North during the same time frame.  This is a moral story 
about the level of intelligence of the U.S. policy makers and their outright lie to the public at large as to 
what is fact and what is fiction.  The possession of “new” intelligence or any intelligence, in a double sense 
of the term, was clearly lacking. See Tom Regan, “Intelligence: Brits plagiarizes student’s work for 
evidence dossier,” Daily Update, An online roundup of a post-Sept. 11 world, csmonitor.com.   
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everything that we know. But what I can share with you, when combined with what all of 
us have learned over the years, is deeply troubling.”38   
 
No Council member with any integrity had the stomach to allow the addition of 
this last insult to an already deep injury.  Therefore, the United States had to isolate itself 
from the U. N. in order to do it alone.  Aside from the peculiar position of the British 
government on the war, it would be absurd to use the term coalition for the U.S. 
aggression and its unfolding crisis of hegemony.  For, the measure of a coalition, aside 
from its quantitative composition, is that it should hide the unilateral nature of US 
actions? Finally, American unilateralism is the subjective reflection of the objective 
forces of “passive revolution” within today’s global polity and economy.  This, in turn, 
provides both necessary and sufficient conditions for the unmistakable loss of hegemony 
and the U.S. tumultuous reaction against it.  The Wolfowitz-Perle project and the 
manifold political and ideological reaction of post-Nine-Eleven, therefore, are compatible 
with my theoretical argument concerning the epochal loss of American hegemony, 
without resorting to a conspiracy theory.    
 
THE OIL SCENARIO AND ITS CRITIQUE39
 The popular oil scenario appears to have roots in the anachronism of the now 
defunct administrative oil system that, long before the current globalization of the world 
economy, once ruled the entire oil industry, from its inception through to the 1950s and 
1960s. Direct physical access, prearranged inter-company allocation, and the necessity 
of geographical control were among the requirements of the old cartelized framework 
that has produced, priced, and distributed oil in the world, in the absence of a fully 
developed transnational oil market.  Institutionally, the traditional petroleum cartels must 
be viewed as a precursor to, and not a substitute for, the highly developed contemporary 
global oil market.  Today’s oil market is very competitive, despite the fact that it has no 
                                                          
38 See Secretary of State Addresses the U. N. Security Council, February 5, 2003: 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030205-1.html (emphasis added).    
39 Substantial part of this section has been directly adapted from my “Oil, Japan, and Globalization,” 
Challenge, May/June 1994, pp. 41-48.  
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resemblance to the Procrustean world of neoclassical (textbook) competition.40  Here, 
contrary to the bourgeois reading of the term, competition is neither benign (perfect) nor 
imperfect.  The integration of business and the centralization of capital bear no similarity 
to the neoclassical notion of monopoly either.  Real competition in capitalism reflects the 
coercive aspect of capital accumulation; thus, the merger, acquisition, downsizing, and 
the process of technological change (in general) constitute the particular forms of this 
competitive struggle. Given the evolution of global oil, the historical phenomenon of 
cartel (and cartelization) served as an intermediate stage in the promotion of the task of 
universal competition and globalization.  Today, no oil region of the world remains 
exempt from the above evolution.  
 
Before dealing with the transformation of the world oil industry into its present 
institutional form, one has to ask once again whether oil has anything to do with the last 
two American involvements in the Persian Gulf.  Admittedly, it is hard to remain 
indifferent to the popular and tempting justification of the oil scenario.  After all, many on 
the right, and many more on the left, vigorously argue that the real reason for the 
deployment of U.S. forces in both the 1990-1991 and 2002-2003 Persian Gulf Wars was 
none other than  “O.I.L.”  On the right, in an interview, James Schlesinger remarked: 
“The United Stated [Bush, the father] has gone to war now, and the American people 
presume this will lead to a secure oil supply. As a society we have made a choice to 
secure access to oil by military means. The alternative is to become independent to a 
large degree of that secure access.”41  On the left, Michael Klare declared: “Two key 
concerns underlie the Administration’s [Bush, the son] thinking: First, the United States 
is becoming dangerously dependent on imported petroleum to meet its daily energy 
requirements, and second, Iraq possesses the world’s largest reserves of untapped 
                                                          
40 See, for instance, Anwar Shaikh, “Marxian Competition Versus Perfect Competition: Further Comments 
on the So-called Choice of Techniques,” Cambridge Journal of Economics, Vol. 4, No. 1, pp. 75-83, and 
Cyrus Bina, The Economics of the Oil Crisis, London: The Merlin Press, 1985 (Ch. 6: “Theories of Pure 
Competition and Competition in Capitalism,”), pp. 55-65.   
41 James Schlesinger, “Interview: Will War Yield Oil Security?” Challenge, March/April, 1991. By the way, 
“secure access” by becoming “independent” is the code-phrase for anachronism of a national oil sector 
and thus an excuse to explore oil from the environmentally unsafe areas, such as the pristine regions of 
Alaska’s wildlife.   
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petroleum after Saudi Arabia.”42 As can be seen, the positions of the right (a right wing, 
Chicago School economist) and the left (a progressive anti-war scholar), on the cause of 
these wars, are remarkably identical.  The question is, why?  Is it because of the 
correctness of neoclassical economic theory in revealing the universal truth?  Or, is it 
because of the ideologically fallacious economic theory that is uncritically accepted by 
the theory-less and clueless left. 43   
 
I contend that, at best, the oil scenario is a text without a context.  On a logical 
level, the oil scenario is a remarkable example of a post hoc, ergo propter hoc fallacy, 
misplacing the real cause of U.S. military intervention.  Moreover, by neglecting the 
depth of the last two decades of global transformation, the protagonists on both the left 
and the right have adopted a very voluntaristic-functionalist view of the U.S. global 
role.44  The left tends to capitalize on a voluntaristic interpretation of the concept of 
hegemony and the functionalist pivot of U.S. military might.  The right, on the other hand, 
tends to rely on the notion of a “unipolar” world and assorted arguments of the “bound to 
                                                          
42 Michael T. Klare, “Oiling the Wheels of War,” The Nation, October 7, 2002.  The corollary of this 
scenario is to give legitimacy to the rightwing in pursuit of drilling in the wildlife under the guise of “project 
independence.” Therefore, the premise of the left is no different from the right on the subject of oil.  On the 
global side, as I have indicated more than a decade ago, “The worst case of distortion [of this oil scenario], 
in my opinion, is the position of the self-styled leftists who are still playing the familiar song and dance of 
OPEC-versus-the United States or the U.S.-versus-Europe [oil] scenario.  By putting fact and fancy on the 
same level, these writers do not hesitate to present the public with heavy-sounding populist statements of 
no theoretical consequence.  While there is no shortage of examples in the literature, one, for instance, 
may see Paul Aarts and Michael Renner, “Oil and the Gulf War,” Middle East Report, July/August 1991.  
Here, the authors explicitly state: ‘A core of Gulf oil exporters is thus pivotal for the supply of oil to the 
world economy.  This is a key reason for Washington’s intervention in the Kuwait crisis (p. 26).  A few 
paragraphs later, the same authors speculate that '‘The U.S. is plying a highly ambivalent role in the 
game,’ presumably because ‘Japan and Western Europe are much more dependent on oil imports than 
the U.S.’ (p. 27).  To be sure, this is a rehash of the same old conspiracy theory that appeared during the 
(1973-74) oil crisis.  For a critique of this hypothesis, see Cyrus Bina, The Economics of the Oil Crisis, op. 
cit., Ch. 2, Sec. 3: ‘Conspiracy Theories of the Oil Crisis’ ” (Cyrus Bina, The Rhetoric of Oil and the 
Dilemma of War and American Hegemony,” op. cit. pp. 18-19).  See also Paul Aarts, “The New Oil Order: 
Built on Sand?” Arab Studies Quarterly, Vol. 16, No. 2, Spring 1994, who tried to respond to my criticism 
above, to which, then, I have written a rejoinder: Cyrus Bina, “On Sand Castles and Sand-Castle 
Conjectures: A Rejoinder,” Arab Studies Quarterly, Vol. 17, Nos. 1 & 2, Winter/Spring1995, pp. 167-171.  
For more recent replication of such an ad hoc thesis about oil as motivation for U.S. war against Iraq, see, 
for instance, James A. Paul, “Oil in Iraq: The Heart of the Crisis,” Global Policy Forum, December 2002: 
http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/oil/2002/12heart.htm.    
43 It is delightful to acknowledge that occasionally some scholars depart from this oil scenario.  One such 
instance is the analysis of the 1990-1991 Gulf War in which Robert Brenner articulately rejects oil, as the 
cause of U.S. intervention, by the process of elimination.  See Robert Brenner, “Why is the United States 
at War with Iraq?” New Left Review, No. 185, January/February 1991.  
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lead” variety, without adequate attention to the existing polarities associated with the 
globalization process.  For both ends of the spectrum, however, the physical access to 
oil and direct control over its production and geographical location plays an important 
role.  Likewise, for both sides, more or less, the spirit of Pax Americana is very much 
alive.  Some writers, including Simon Bromley, maintained that not only has the U.S. 
hegemony never been on the decline, but it has also gained further strength, after the 
fall of the Soviet Union and the recent U.S. military victory against Iraq.45   
 
Finally, the Aspects of India’s Economy, a militant leftist electronic journal from 
India, devoted its entire December 2002 double-issue to “What is Behind the Invasion of 
Iraq.”46  In this context, the authors raise the question of why the U.S. government is 
trying to buy friendship from the Government of India and how much of this could be 
motivated by the desire to block China.  The core of the analysis rests on (1) the 
supposition of colonialism and control, (2) the existence of Pax Americana and the 
presence of U.S. hegemony, (3) the assumption of American quest for oil, (4) the 
perceived monopoly of OPEC, and (5) the attempted conversion of oil revenue 
denomination from U.S. dollar to euro by OPEC oil producers.  Others have made 
literally a cottage industry on the Internet out of the last point.47  I did not find any 
detectable inaccuracy in exposition of the facts in this volume.  However, the question of 
facts is one thing and their accurate interpretation is quite another.  To be sure, the oil 
scenario remains the frame of the mind of the authors, compounded unjustifiably by the 
question of switching the oil currencies.  As Krugman pointed out in his short note, any 
possible shift from the U.S. dollar to the euro on the part of OPEC will result in a “small 
change”.48  However, the authors of “What is Behind the Invasion of Iraq,” given their 
untenable approach, are not losing any opportunity to grasp this straw.    
 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
44 See, for instance, Edward N. Krapels, “The Commanding Heights: International Oil in a Changed 
World,” International Affairs, Vol. 69, No.1, January 1993 for a crudely voluntaristic argument.   
45 Simon Bromley, American Hegemony and World Oil, University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State 
University, 1991, and my review of it in Harvard Middle Eastern and Islamic Review, Vol. 1, No. 2.   
46 “Behind the Invasion of Iraq,” Aspects of India’s Economy, Nos. 33 & 34, December 2002.    
47 See, for instance, Wilson’s Almanac, “The Real Reasons for the Upcoming War with Iraq,” January 
2003: http://www.wilsonsalmanac.com/euro.html.  
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OIL: IN EVOLUTIONARY STAGES 
The history of Middle Eastern Oil, including its subsequent development into a 
modern industry, can be divided into three distinct stages: (1) the era of international 
cartelization, 1901-50; (2) the era of transition, 1950-1972; and (3) the era of 
globalization and unified accumulation since 1974.  A slightly different historical 
periodization can be provided for the U.S. domestic oil industry: (1) the era of classical 
cartelization and the early oil trusts of 1870-1910; (2) the era of regulated neo-
cartelization of 1911-72; and (3) the era of globalization and unified accumulation since 
1974.49  A close examination of the entire 1870-1970 period would reveal that 
administrative pricing and cartel practices were predominantly the rule in the oil 
business.  These practices, however, began to lose their considerable command and 
effectiveness in the 1950s and 1960s.  Proliferating market forces that gradually, but 
forcefully, challenged the total administrative control overtook the domain of oil pricing 
by the international oil cartel, known as the “Seven Sisters.” 
 
The second stage in the development of the Middle Eastern oil industry 
constitutes a transition to transnationalization and a tendency toward a unified global 
pricing of oil (1950-1972).  This stage saw a transitory coexistence of the declining 
cartelized institutions and the proliferation of market relations, which were conducive to 
competitive global pricing.  Here, it can be demonstrated that the cartelization of oil 
belongs to an historical stage in which the institutional framework of global capitalism 
has not yet been fully developed.  The basic identifying features of this period are: (1) 
the dominance of long-term oil contracts (the concession system50); (2) the 
establishment of “basing point” oil pricing in the Persian Gulf identical to the price of oil 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
48 See Paul Krugman, “Nothing for Money,” March 14, 2003: 
http://www.wwsprinceton.edu/~pkrugman/oildollar.html.  
49 The Oil Crisis of 1973-1974 was precisely the crisis of transformation and globalization of the oil 
industry.  The so-called “OPEC offensive” was indeed a catalyst of de-cartelization and globalization of oil.  
Globalization of oil, in turn, changed the nature of OPEC from some sort of countervailing power vis-à-vis 
the “Seven Sisters,” to a rent-collecting entity within the competitive (i.e., spot and futures markets) 
structure of global oil pricing.  See Cyrus Bina, The Economics of the Oil Crisis, 1985, op. cit., Ch. 6: 
“Theories of Pure Competition and Competition in Capitalism,” pp. 55-65.   
50 An oil concession is essentially a colonial contract similar to the arrangements by East India Company.    
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in the Gulf of Mexico (U.S.); (3) the utilization of “posted prices”51 for the calculation of 
exporting country oil revenues; and (4) the formation of OPEC.52  During this period, 
given the desire for stabilizing the “basing-point” price of oil at the Gulf of Mexico, U.S. 
domestic oil has also been controlled.53  This basing-point system, which was based on 
the wellhead price of U.S. oil at the Gulf of Mexico, had long been used as an 
administrative yardstick for the pricing of oil anywhere in the world.54  
 
Given the new and bountiful discoveries of cheaper oil in the Persian Gulf, oil 
from the Middle Eastern region has gradually displaced U.S. oil, even in the regional 
markets close to the Western Hemisphere.  This has prompted international oil cartel to 
cut the Persian Gulf posted prices in order to control the interregional flow of oil vis-à-vis 
the U.S. oil region. (Since the “posted price” was used as a mechanism for internal 
transfer of oil, from one company to another, within the cartel, cutting the posted price of 
Persian Gulf oil leads to reduction of supply from this region, thus reducing the flow of oil 
to Western markets.) But the very fact that the companies were able to do just that 
proves how huge the profits of their Middle East Oil operations must have been.  It also 
shows that, in the absence of a fully developed global oil market, how tight the cartel’s 
grip was over the control of both U.S. domestic and international oil. This transitional 
period also saw the formation of OPEC, which represented the major rent-collecting oil 
producers and thus created a potential for the recognition of oil rent as a price-
determined economic category in the modern oil industry.  As a result, the struggle over 
the magnitude of the “posted prices” has been the focal point of contention between the 
international oil cartel and the oil-exporting states for the years to come.  
 
Toward the end of the 1960s, there emerged two major developments, which 
forcefully undermined the cartelized character of the industry and helped to unify the 
pricing of oil globally.  First, there appeared a sweeping macroeconomic change in 
                                                          
51 The “posted price” was the price according to which the transfer of crude oil within the worldwide 
network of the “Seven Sisters” was accounted for.  See also sources in Footnote #3.   
52 The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) was formed in 1960.  The original founders 
were Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela. See Cyrus Bina, “Limits of OPEC Pricing: OPEC 
Profits and the Nature of Global Oil Accumulation,” OPEC Review, Vol. 14, No. 1, Spring 1990.   
53 See Robert Engler, The Brotherhood of Oil, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977.   
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OPEC’s relationship with the TNOCs55; this had to do with further integration of these 
oil-exporting countries into the world economy.  Second, there was a considerable 
increase in the exploration and development costs of U.S. domestic oil (already among 
the highest costs in the world).   This was due, in part, to the highly fragmented domestic 
oil leases connected to the new oil exploration activities and, in part, to the exorbitant 
cost of additional capital investments made by the U.S. domestic producers in the 
existing and, certainly, aging U.S. oilfields.56
 
  Today, contrary to previous historical stages, oil pricing is the outcome of global 
competition among the existing oil regions of the world.  These oil regions exhibit cost 
structures of varying magnitudes; however, in competition, the leaseholders must obtain 
an average rate of profit in the long run in order to stay in business.  Given the 
persistence of differential costs (reflecting the differential productivity) among these 
regions, any low-cost oil region would thus show profits that are above the industry’s 
average.  In other words, the low-cost oil regions, in addition to average, would show 
additional profits that are commensurate with their own differential cost advantage. 
These excess profits belong to the distinct category of oil rent; which, the lessor, the 
owner of oil-in-place, is able to appropriate accordingly.  The size of the oil rents, 
therefore, is simply dependent upon the magnitude of differential productivity (and, by 
implication, the differential profitability) of all competing oil regions globally.  Hence, 
differential profits turn into differential oil rents; and all differential oil rents are price-
determined.57  This universal rule applies equally to both OPEC and non-OPEC 
producers.  This explains, for instance, why OPEC prices are no longer insulated from 
the determining (and at times, undermining) impact of spot prices in the global oil 
market. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
54 See John M. Blair, The Control of Oil, New York: Pantheon Books, 1976.  
55 I use TNOCs (Transnational Oil Companies) interchangeably with “Seven Sisters” or International Oil 
Cartel.   
56 See the sources cited in footnote #3, particularly, The Economics of the Oil Crisis (1985).  
57 Footnote #60 contains further discussions on the differential oil rents and the question of “absolute rent.” 
For further examination of the theoretical points raised in this section, the reader is referred to the sources 
in Footnote #3 above.   
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The development of global spot (and futures markets) in the oil industry is indeed 
the consequence of: (1) the extent of globalization of the oil industry and, in turn, the 
profundity of the integration of the oil-producing nation-states within the global economy; 
(2) the critical importance of U.S. oil cost structure in setting the price of oil worldwide; 
(3) the tendential unification of existing oil regions under a unified pricing rule; (4) the 
replacement of the cartelized arrangements and administrative pricing by the inherently 
unsettled forces within the global oil market; and, by implication, (5) the development of 
OPEC as a rent-collecting association, with no apparent immunity from the influence of 
market forces and constraining oil market fundamentals. 
 
The onset of these post-cartel changes obtained its original form in the oil crisis of 
the early 1970s, which, in turn, initiated the global restructuring of the entire oil industry.  
The consequence of all this was the emergence of worldwide competitive prices based 
on the costliest oil region (namely, U.S. domestic oil) and the formation of worldwide 
differential oil rents for the more productive oil regions globally.  Thus, contrary to 
popular belief, it is not OPEC, but U.S. domestic oil that is critically setting the price of oil 
worldwide.  Thus, the imagined war-for-oil scenario is actually a throwback to a golden 
age - a nostalgic plea that interjects the past into the uncertain future.  Any oil-related 
American incentive, however, can be explained in terms of the mere disbursement of the 
Iraqi oil rents in conjunction with the U.S. Middle East strategic objectives in this “new 
world disorder.”     
 
THE MISMEASURE OF “BLOOD FOR OIL”  
 
For those who do not wish to bother with the technical details surrounding the 
value-theoretic issues on the question of oil and its globalization, I have devised a 
simple exercise for the calculation of Iraqi oil rents.  This is intended for a straightforward 
dialog with the converging millions that are airing their reverberating voice so 
wonderfully throughout the simultaneity of the global peace movement.  As we have 
seen, these global voices are raised in unison against the jingoist attitude of the Bush 
administration and its war-peddling partners in the British government, symbolically the 
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coalition of the hegemonic yesteryear.  To be sure, this globalizing peace tendency 
acted against the new U.S. foreign policy based on the preemption and anachronism of 
Bush’s “permanent war scenario,” which is contrary to the present era of globalization.   
 
The globalization of oil since the mid-1970s has rendered the sui generis 
categories of “access” and “dependency” meaningless.58  As I have demonstrated 
above, the post-cartelization of oil is simultaneous with global competition and, 
consequently, formation of differential oil rents across the global oil industry.  Based on 
my value-theoretic framework, I distinguish between what is “organic” and what is 
“conjectural” in the pricing of oil.59  To be sure, the price of production of the highly 
explored oilfields within the U.S. lower 48 states is the global center of gravity of oil 
prices everywhere. As a result, in competition, the more productive oilfields in the world 
are potentially able to collect additional profits in terms of oil rents.  Moreover, magnitude 
of such rents mirror the magnitude of the corresponding (differential) productivity of the 
existing oilfield anywhere in the world.60  Hence, despite the ideological hold, intuitive 
                                                          
58 See, for instance, Michael T. Klare, “Oiling the Wheels of War,” The Nation, October 7, 2002. He is still 
singing to the old tunes that are relevant only to the old times. 
59 This is parallel with Gramsci’s interpretation of Marx in the realm of politics, which is consistent with 
appropriate interpretation of value theory and its mediating manifestation in the market prices.  “A common 
error in historico-political analysis consists in an inability to find the correct relation between what is 
organic and what is conjectural.  This leads to presenting causes as immediately operative, which in fact 
only operate indirectly, or to asserting that the immediate causes are the only effective ones.  In the first 
case there is an excess of ‘economism,’ or doctrine of pedantry; in the second, an excess of ‘ideologism’ ” 
(Gramsci, 1971, p. 178).      
60 Differential oil rent is not the same as “monopoly” rent.  It is, rather, a measure of comparative 
productivity of the various oilfields in competition.  As for the Marxian concept of “absolute rent” and its 
presumable relevance to the oil industry, I wish to make two points.   First, from the standpoint of the 
dynamics of accumulation, absolute rent belongs to a rent-collecting sector (i.e., an industry entangled in 
“landed property”) whose “organic composition of capital” is below the “average.” Therefore, the effect of 
“landed property” upon the investment of capital, via the appropriation of a portion of surplus value, 
potentially leads to keeping the “composition of capital” below average.  Here, “landed property” creates 
the category of “absolute rent,” regardless of the existing qualities of land.  In this connection and in 
Marxian terms, cost price remains below the magnitude of value (or production price is below value).   
Therefore, according to Marx, development of capitalism and the historical limitation of landed property 
may lead to the increasing “composition of capital” in agriculture beyond the “average,” thus removing the 
material basis of “absolute rent” (see Marx Engels, Collected Works, Vol. 31, New York: International 
Publishers, 1989, pp. 464-477).   Secondly, when “individual production price” of the least productive land 
(or oilfield) is the governing “price of production” of the entire industry, then the production from such a 
land (or oilfield) may not be possible without the payment of rent to the owner.  In this case, “absolute rent” 
will be a part of the surplus value on all lands, the limit to which is set by the extent of Differential Rent II 
(DR II).  Why?  DR II corresponds with the application of varying capital to a specific quality of land 
already under cultivation, thus bypassing the imposition of additional leasing costs associated with a new 
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appeal, and the magical portrayal of OPEC as a “monopoly,” a fairly analytical mind 
would not fall for the ideological underpinnings of the oil scenario.  Thus, the left needs 
to rise above the mere regurgitation of the ad hoc, uncritical, and tautological constructs 
of corporate media and corporate capitalism.    
 
Let us look at a simple exercise, attempting the calculation of the value of all Iraqi 
proven oil reserves in today’s prices61. According to recent estimates, the Iraqi proven oil 
reserves are nearly 110 billion barrels of recoverable oil. In two separate scenarios, let 
us assume two alternative production-schedules of 2.5 and 5 million daily barrels, as 
follows: 
 If the rate of utilization of these reserves, ceteris paribus, will be set at 2.5 and 5 
million average daily barrels, these oil reserves would be exhausted within nearly 
120 years and 60 years, respectively.  Accordingly, our respective annual 
production schedules are: 
 
1) [2.5 * 365 = 912.5] 912.5 million of annual barrels; 
2) [5.0 * 365 = 1,825] 1,825 million of annual barrels. 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
lease (see Ben Fine, “On Marx’s Theory of agricultural Rent,” Economy & Society, Vol. 8, August 1979, 
pp. 241-278). Yet, this absolute rent is not the same as “monopoly rent,” which is an ad hoc category and 
a point of departure from the fictional notion of competition in the neoclassical economics.  At any rate, if 
there will be any absolute rent in the oil industry, its very source is located in the least productive oilfields 
of the United States, not OPEC.  Moreover, OPEC oil reserves are not under the ownership of private sub-
surface land.  In the context of capital accumulation, these reserves are jointly owned by the capitalist 
state itself, which also represents the public ownership of the sub-surface land, with no obstruction of the 
private landed property (see Marx Engels, op. cit., pp. 519-520, when the landowner and capitalist are 
one).  Consequently, it would be incorrect to attribute the formation of “absolute rent” to OPEC as, for 
instance, Chibuzo Nwoke implies.  He explicitly reveals his error by stating that “The ‘monopoly ownership’ 
of Third World landlord governments would be stronger, and the magnitude of absolute rent exacted by 
them would be greater, as the demand for minerals expands and the supply of rich mineral deposits 
becomes more limited” (Chibuzo Nwoke, Third World Minerals and Global Pricing, London: Zed Books, 
1987, p. 30).  Perplexed by the Ricardian decreasing margin, Nwoke claims, mistakenly, that the least 
productive global oilfields are located in the North Sea and Alaska, rather than the lower 48 states of the 
United States.  Nwoke also makes no references to my Economics of the Oil Crisis (1985), which was 
available some two years before the publication of his own book in 1987.   
61 I wish to stress that this is a rough exercise for the sake of illustration and approximation of order of 
magnitude of the value of Iraqi oil rents.  For obvious reasons, any change in the assumptions involved in 
this exercise results in different figures.   My intention is to show the rough order of magnitude of the 
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  Assuming $20.00 per barrel for the price Iraqi oil (viz. the 1990s average market 
price) and about $10.00 for the Persian Gulf differential oil rent (see Bina, 1985 
for meaning and approximate magnitude of oil rents).  
 
 Let’s further assume: 
 
1) 8% real discount rate;  
2) 3% annual inflation rate; 
3) 3% annual growth rate of addition to the proven reserves.  
SCENARIO I:  Given the annual production volume of 912.5 million barrels within 
120 years and $10.00 of differential oil rent per barrel, the value of 
differential oil rents for 120 years is as follows:   
 
912.5 million * 120 = 109.5 billion barrels 
109.5 billion barrels * $10 = $1.095 trillion. 
   
Given 8% annual discount rate, 3% annual rate inflation, and 3% 
annual growth rate of addition to the proven reserves, we have 
applicable rate of discount of 8 percent (8% + (3% - 3%) = 8%).   
 
Thus, Present Value of $1.095 trillion at 8% discount rate to be 
received in lump sum after 120 years is $106.8 million.  
 
SCENARIO II:  Given the annual production volume of 1,825 million barrels within 
60 years and $10.00 differential oil rent per barrel, the value of 
differential oil rents at the end of 60 years is as follows:   
 
1,825 million * 60 = 109.5 billion barrels 
  109.5 billion * $10 = $1.095 trillion. 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
cumulative value of Iraqi oil not simply for 10 or 12 years of occupation but for the longer period near to 
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 Given 8% annual discount rate, 3% annual rate inflation, and 3% 
annual growth rate of addition to the proven reserves, we would 
have applicable rate of discount of 8 percent (8% + (3% - 3%) = 
8%).   
 
Thus, Present Value of $1.095 trillion at 8% discount rate to be 
received in lump sum after 60 years is $10.81 billion.   
 
Based upon the second scenario (the much larger figure of the two), the price tag 
for differential oil rents in Iraq is slightly less than $11 billion.  Now, let’s assume that the 
Iraqi oil reserves are underestimated, say, that they are five times the reported figures. 
Thus, ceteris paribus, one would arrive at $11 billion * 5 = $55 billion.  Now, let’s double 
our reasonable figure of $10 for differential rent per barrel. Again, we would never ever 
arrive at a figure much larger than $110 billion for the present value of all differential oil 
rents to be paid to the Iraqis.  In other words, the “Iraqi oil price tag” does not exceed 
$110 billion to be received in lump sum at the end of the period.  This is indeed chump 
change, given the staggering costs associated with the prosecuting the war and the 
unanticipated financial and incalculable human costs of the subsequent occupation of 
Iraq.   
 
Let’s further assume that the proceeds from differential oil rents in Iraq will be 
received on an annual basis for, say, 55 long years.    In other words, assume that the 
Bush administration and its future successors are able to invent a pill that tranquilizes, 
not only the people of Iraq but also the people of the entire world in order to calmly and 
comfortably steal the Iraqi oil rents for 55 years, till 2058.  Now we need to calculate the 
summation of the present value of annuitized annual Iraqi oil rents for the period of 55 
years.  This scenario is more realistic since the payments of oil rents are made on an 
annual basis.  Again, for the sake of argument, I have chosen a much larger average 
figure of 5 million daily barrels, assuming a very optimistic production schedule: 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
the estimated time of the exhaustion of reserves in Iraq.     
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  5 million * 365 = 1.825 billion annual barrels, 
 1.825 billion * $10 = $18.25 billion. 
 
The Present Value of $18.250 billion annual payment, to be paid for 55 
consecutive years is equal to $224.8 billion.  
 
Now, let me ask: Given the limited magnitude of these figures, would it be justified 
to mask the real cause of this war and disguise the real epochal reasons behind it?  
According to Nordhaus estimates, the direct and indirect costs of forceful occupation of 
Iraq would range somewhere between $120 billion and $1.6 trillion over a 10-year 
period.62   Should my estimated value of Iraqi oil warrant such a huge undertaking?  
Finally, why do people find it necessary to appeal to anachronistic and misleading 
phrases, such as “No Blood for Oil”? Would it not be better for the Left, and for the 
global peace-movement in general, to re-examine the meaning of their actions and 
slogans?   Isn’t it worthwhile for the Left to study the stigma of commodity fetishism 
behind this phrase?  It is apparent that some of us are the victims of our own tautological 
pronouncements, particularly when it comes to the assessment of oil.63  For instance, 
                                                          
62 William D. Nordhaus, “Iraq: The Economic Consequences of War,” New York Review of Books, Vo. 49, 
No. 19, December 5, 2002; see also Dean Baker and Mark Weisbrot, “The Economic Costs of a War in 
Iraq: The Negative Scenario,” December 9, 202: http://www.cepr.net/Costs%20of%war.htm.  The figures 
resulted from my calculation are tentative and thus intended for illustration of the order of magnitude for 
the estimated lifetime of Iraqi oil deposits.  Reference to Nordhaus’ figures for a decade of involvement in 
Iraq is just for a rough comparison.  I had no intention of critically examining his assumptions.  It is my 
contention that, in reality, neither appealing to epochal misconceptions, such as “access,” “U.S. 
dependency,” nor resorting to the “strategic” and “metaphysical” portrayal of oil as an object of occupation, 
nor capitalizing on the plunder alone would render oil as the cause of the U.S. aggression.  Rather the 
cause is the epochal dismantling of American hegemony and the desperate U.S. reaction.   
63 Others who have faith in the “oil scenario” may argue differently that this war may not be for oil in the 
interests of the U.S. as a whole but rather in the interest of “oil corporations in the U.S.”  As a result, they 
propose that the cost of war must be a huge subsidy that is paid by the entire society to the oil industry 
alone. Replacing the cause of the war with its effects, this argument reduces the material interest of the 
entire capitalist class and U.S. capitalism to the interest of a tiny fraction.  This reduction is twofold: (1) on 
the ontological and material side, it reduces the entire American capitalism to oil; (2) on the 
epistemological side, it is a reduction of the whole to one of its constituent parts.  At the same time, this 
“popular belief” is often silent on the purported reasons behind the “priority” of oil interests, other than 
echoing the news from the Iraqi oilfields and the departure of oil service contractors for “rebuilding” Iraq.  
Methodologically, of course, this amounts to a cardinal sin. Why?  Because it is tautology: the proposition 
that has yet to be examined has been deceptively turned into a foregone conclusion in the argument.   
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Michael Klare wants us to believe that “It’s the Oil, Stupid.”64  His appeal is apparently to 
causal observation, without the benefit of mediating epochal analysis.  For him, business 
seems as usual: the present polity is the continuation of the past.  The American 
hegemony remains intact, if not enhanced. To prove the oil scenario, he thus refers us to 
the news from the Iraqi oilfields, just like a cute observer who points to the sunrise and 
sunset and has us believe that the Sun rotates about the Earth.  Then he adds an insult 
to the injury and tells us, “It’s the oil, stupid”.  To conclude my argument, given the above 
analysis, let me ask Professor Klare graciously: is it really the oil, stupid?    
 
 
 
                                                          
64 See Michael T. Klare, “It’s the Oil, Stupid,” The Nation, May 12, 2003; Gore Vidal. “Blood for Oil,” The 
Nation, October 28, 2002.   
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
It has been argued that, on three separate occasions since the 1980s, the United 
States intervened in the Persian Gulf. The first was the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988); the 
second and third have been the 1990-1991 and 2002-2003 Persian Gulf Wars against 
Saddam Hussein.  The way that the last two wars were fought, however, is an 
unfortunate throwback to the good old colonial days of gunboat diplomacy, an 
anachronism similar to the Pax Britannica’s unmediated political and economic 
engagements.  As we have learned from the tumultuous history of Pax Britannica, this 
golden rule of unmediated and belligerent domination did not survive the “passive 
revolution” and the political challenges of its time. The gunboat diplomacy did not work 
then.  
 
On the other hand, the ascent of Pax Americana was predicated upon the 
hegemony of its mediating institutions and the epochal capacity for internalizing the 
post-Second World War “passive revolutions.” However, as the objective forces of 
globalization, and the subjective political challenges—from within and from without—
exceeded its internal capacity and structure in the mid-to-late 1970s, Pax Americana 
collapsed under its own weight. The collapse of Pax Americana is, therefore, the 
precursor of eventual loss of the U.S. global hegemony.   
 
In this context ipso facto one may view the dismantling of the postwar Doctrine of 
Containment and the installment of the post-Pax Americana Doctrine Preemption as the 
end of the end of U.S. global hegemony.  And, it is in this context alone that the 
belligerent reactions of the U.S. are severely self-limiting—and self-defeating.  The 
adventurous foreign policy of the Bush administration, in general, and its specific 
application to the recent slaughter in Iraq, constitute the subjective reaction to the 
objective loss of the U.S. global hegemony. I have argued at length that such nostalgic 
acts of conquest and control are the real underlying motivation behind the war, not the 
oil. This is not to suggest an idealist (psychological) rather than materialist explanation 
for the war in Iraq. Rather, it is to argue that these nostalgic acts represent a discursive 
reaction to the material transformation and epochal forces of globalization.  As I have 
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demonstrated throughout this paper, this motivation is of an epochal nature and, as 
such, it is a million times more dangerous for the global peace and stability than the 
flimsy argument of the purported oil motive.  
 
 
16 May 2003 
Minnesota, USA. 
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